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Executive summary
Now that the apprenticeship levy has completed its first full year of operation, this report 
reviews the available evidence to determine whether the levy will, as the Government 
hopes, “incentivise more employers to provide quality apprenticeships” and “transform 
the lives of young people who secure them”. 
The levy itself is, in effect, a tax of 0.5 per cent on the pay bill of organisations with annual 
wages of over £3 million. These organisations pay their levy contributions into a ‘digital 
account’ held by HMRC and can then ‘spend’ their contributions on apprenticeship 
training delivered by registered providers. Smaller employers can also access the funds 
generated through the levy, although they must pay a ‘co-investment’ of 10 per cent 
towards the cost of the training.
The impact of the levy on the quantity of apprenticeships
In the six months after the levy was introduced (April - October 2017), the number of 
people starting an apprenticeship was 162,400 – over 40 per cent lower than the same 
period in the previous year. A similar downward trend was also evident across November 
and December.
When the new employer-designed ‘apprenticeship standards’ were originally written and 
delivered in 2014 and 2015, they were concentrated on younger age groups. Since the 
levy began operating, the age category with the highest number of people starting to train 
towards one of the new ‘apprenticeship standards’ is the over-25s instead.
In addition, the mix of apprenticeship levels is shifting away from ‘Intermediate’ (Level 2; 
equivalent to GCSEs) towards Higher and Degree Apprenticeships (Levels 4-6; equivalent 
to the first year of university through to a full degree). From 2016 to 2017 the percentage 
of apprenticeship starts at Level 2 dropped by 8 per cent. Meanwhile the proportion of 
apprenticeships delivered at higher levels (Level 4+) has grown markedly since the levy 
began but just 12 per cent of these higher-level apprenticeships have been provided to 
those aged under 19. 
The changing age profile and the movement towards training at higher levels suggests 
that more experienced and older workers are increasingly becoming the focus of the 
apprenticeship programme, at the expense of less experienced and younger employees.
Alongside the levy, the Conservative Party remains committed to its 2015 manifesto 
pledge that 3 million people will start an apprenticeship between 2015 and 2020. 
Commentators have consistently raised concerns over this target, and previous similar 
targets, as they prioritise the quantity of apprenticeships rather than necessarily 
increasing their quality.
The impact of the levy on the quality of apprenticeships
The introduction of the levy has diminished the quality of apprenticeships. The list of roles 
now officially counted as an ‘apprenticeship’ includes many low-skill and often very short 
training courses, all of which can now be delivered using the funds generated by the levy. 
These roles include serving customers in a delicatessen or coffee shop, working on a 
hotel reception desk, performing basic office administration and serving food and drink in 
a restaurant. Such training courses do not meet the historical or international definition of 
an apprenticeship because they typically offer minimal training, represent low-wage jobs 
and do not constitute skilled occupations. 
Employers are also using the levy to rebadge existing training courses as apprenticeships 
to shift the costs of training onto the Government instead. The most obvious examples of 
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this relabelling are found in leadership and management skills. The list of the most popular 
apprenticeship standards includes becoming a ‘Team Leader’, ‘Supervisor’ or ‘Manager’. 
Cranfield University’s prestigious School of Management has even re-designated its existing 
Executive MBA as an apprenticeship to attract up to a 90 per cent government subsidy 
towards the programme costs. Such examples further illustrate how the apprenticeship 
levy is encouraging employers to prioritise older and more experienced workers instead of 
improving the recruitment and training of young people in skilled occupations.
Almost 40 per cent of the ‘apprenticeship standards’ approved by the Government since 
2012 fail to reach the international or historical definition of an apprenticeship. These 
mislabelled courses are consuming over 20 per cent of the funding available for newly-
designed apprenticeships. Without reform, in 2019-20 the Government will spend £600 
million on courses incorrectly labelled as apprenticeships, out of the £2.7 billion expected 
to be raised in that year.
How	the	levy	has	affected	employers
Employers and employers’ groups have become increasingly critical towards the levy 
since its launch, primarily due to the burdens associated with accessing the levy funds as 
well as identifying and selecting training and assessment providers. Surveys of employers 
have suggested that, instead of increasing the amount of training offered to employees, 
they were considering cutting their non-apprenticeship training budgets or writing off the 
levy as a tax and ignoring it. International evidence from the OECD also indicated that the 
design of the levy was flawed from the outset. For example, there is no arms-length body 
or agency to coordinate how the funding will be used and there is the prospect of 
substantial ‘deadweight’ as companies try to claim levy funds for as many forms of 
training as possible. The substantial increase in bureaucracy, plus several other issues, 
has led business groups to brand the levy ‘disastrous’, ‘confusing’ and ‘broken’.
How	the	levy	has	affected	providers
The Register of Apprenticeship Training Providers, which lists all the organisations eligible 
to receive government funding for training apprentices, has been beset by difficulties. 
New organisations appeared on this register despite having no track record in delivering 
apprenticeships or even a set of financial accounts available, and early indications 
suggest that they could be performing poorly. Meanwhile, some high-performing and 
established training providers have missed out. The Register of Assessment 
Organisations has also struggled to command the respect of stakeholders, with serious 
concerns being raised about its approach to monitoring the end-point assessments for 
apprentices and its ability to highlight and address poor-quality provision. 
Conclusion 
The opening page of the Government-sponsored Richard Review, published in 2012, 
observed that the growth in apprenticeship numbers in the preceding years had “led us to 
stretch the definition of what an apprenticeship is too far and, as a consequence, we risk 
losing sight of the core features of what makes apprenticeships work, what makes them 
unique.” Six years on, there is a real danger that the same mistakes could be made all 
over again. The evidence from the first year of the apprenticeship levy suggests that 
significant reforms are needed if the Government is to deliver its aim of high-quality 
apprenticeships for young people at greater volume. At present, the levy is too 
complicated for employers, focused on too many inappropriate forms of training and as a 
result is unlikely to deliver value-for-money. If the necessary changes described in this 
report are made then apprentices, taxpayers and employers across the country stand to 
benefit for many years to come.
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Recommendations
To realise the objectives set out in the Richard Review for funding apprenticeships – 
namely that the system must be simple, accessible and encourage employers to offer 
them without asking for greater investment overall – this report outlines six significant 
changes that are required:
Recommendation 1: The target for 3 million apprenticeship starts by 2020 should be 
abandoned so that the focus can be placed on apprenticeship quality above all else.
Recommendation 2: The Government should introduce a new internationally-
benchmarked definition of an ‘apprenticeship’ and any apprenticeship standard that does 
not meet this definition should be withdrawn. 
Recommendation 3: The requirement for 10 per cent employer co-investment towards 
the cost of training apprentices should be removed with immediate effect to avoid 
employers disengaging from apprenticeships.
Recommendation 4: The Government should replace the existing HMRC digital 
payment system with a simpler ‘apprenticeship voucher’ model to give employers control 
of government funding while reducing their administrative burdens.
Recommendation 5: All apprenticeship standards and end-point assessments for 
apprentices should be assigned a fixed cost by the Education and Skills Funding Agency 
to remove the need for complicated price and contract negotiations between employers 
and both training and assessment providers. 
Recommendation 6: The exam regulator Ofqual should be made the only option for 
quality assuring the end-point assessments for apprentices to ensure that standards are 
maintained over time and poor practice is quickly identified and eradicated. 
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Introduction
Apprenticeships have a long history in this country, dating back to the 16th century.1 Their 
central place in the education system as a way of training young people in skilled crafts 
and trades continued well into the twentieth century, with approximately 240,000 
apprentices being supported each year by the mid-1960s. Nevertheless, concerns began 
to emerge around this time related to the traditional model of apprenticeships, not least 
because it was failing to keep up with the rapidly changing demands arising from 
industrial and technological advancement.2 This was compounded by the decline of the 
manufacturing sector in the 1970s, the weakening influence of trade unions and the falling 
demand for goods produced by trades associated with the apprenticeship model.3 
Consequently, apprenticeship numbers fell from 171,000 in 1968 to just 34,500 in 1990,4 
although a handful of sectors such as manufacturing, construction and engineering 
retained their involvement. 
Successive governments sought to reverse this decline through initiatives such as the 
introduction of ‘Modern Apprenticeships’ in 1994.5 However, the temporary boost in 
numbers that this produced was accompanied by criticisms of the weak level of 
knowledge and understanding required by apprentices and the considerable variability 
across sectors.6 In 2004 apprenticeships were rebranded yet again so that ‘Modern 
Apprenticeships’ became known simply as ‘Apprenticeships’ at Level 2 (equivalent to 
GCSEs) and ‘Advanced Apprenticeships’ at Level 3 (equivalent to A-levels) and above, 
while the upper-age limit of 25 for apprenticeships was abandoned. 
In 2006 the Labour government published a review by Lord Leitch (the Leitch Review) that 
examined the UK’s skills system. It praised the Government’s achievements, citing the rise 
in the number of young people participating in apprenticeships from 75,000 in 1997 to 
255,000 in 2005.7 That said, the completion rate for apprenticeships was just 53 per cent 
and the review noted that “expanding the available levels and qualifying ages means that 
there are more apprenticeships but may dilute the overall brand”.8 Despite this warning, 
the Leitch Review recommended that the Government should boost the number of 
apprenticeships to 500,000 by 2020.
The number of people starting an apprenticeship began to rise following the Leitch 
Review, although this expansion was driven almost entirely by the rapid growth in 
apprenticeships for adults, while the number of young people starting an apprenticeship 
actually fell from 2007 to 2009.9 In addition, a House of Lords Select Committee found 
that the number of apprentices enrolled on Level 3 programmes was falling too,10 but the 
provision of apprenticeships at lower levels – permitted since 2001 – was propping up the 
overall figures. Reductions in the quality of apprenticeships were being identified as well, 
with one witness telling the Select Committee that the Government was showing “a lack 
of commitment …to maintaining acceptable minimum standards of training.”11 The 
Committee concluded that, although apprenticeship numbers had increased substantially 
since 1996, “most of this increase has been as a result of converting government-
1  House of Commons Library, ‘A Short History of Apprenticeships in England: From Medieval Craft Guilds to the 
Twenty-First Century’, Webpage, 9 March 2015.
2  Learning and Skills Council, Rapid Review of Research on Apprenticeships, 2008, 11.
3  Paul Ryan and Lorna Unwin, ‘Apprenticeship in the British Training Market’, National Institute Economic Review 178, no. 
1 (October 2001): 99–114.
4  Learning and Skills Council, Rapid Review of Research on Apprenticeships, 12.
5  James Mirza-Davies, Apprenticeships Policy, England Prior to 2010, Briefing Paper 07266 (House of Commons Library, 
2015), 3. This resulted in apprentices counting as employees and being paid a wage as well as requiring them to work 
towards a qualification at Level 3 (equivalent to A-levels).
6  Ibid., 7.
7  HM Treasury, Leitch Review of Skills: Prosperity for All in the Global Economy - World Class Skills, 2006, 97.
8  Ibid., 98
9  Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Quarterly Statistical First Release - Post-16 Education & Skills: Learner 
Participation, Outcomes and Level of Highest Qualification Held, 2012, 31.
10  House of Lords Select Committee on Education Affairs, House of Lords Select Committee on Education Affairs, 
Apprenticeship: A Key Route to Skill (Volume 1), 5th Report of Session 2006–07, HL Paper 138-I (London: Stationery 
Office, 2007).
11  Ibid., 13.
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supported programmes of work-based learning into apprenticeships”.12 Poor completion 
rates – as low as 10 per cent in some sectors – continued to hamper the programme and 
the Select Committee expressed their worry that “too much emphasis has been placed 
on quantity of apprenticeships, and not enough on quality”.13
Figure 1: Increase in the number of people starting an apprenticeship
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Source: Department for Education, Statistics: further education and skills, 2002-2012.
It was suggested at the time that the sharp increase in ‘apprenticeship starts’ after the 
2010 General Election (see Figure 1) was in fact the result of shifting adult learners into the 
apprenticeship programme from the previous government’s ‘Train to Gain’ scheme (which 
was being closed down).14 Regardless, the expansion in apprenticeship numbers was 
welcomed by the House of Commons Business, Innovation and Skills Select Committee 
in their report on apprenticeships in 2012 but they said “there is a risk that the rapid 
expansion may result in the programme becoming less focused” and “the success of the 
apprenticeship programme should not be judged by numbers alone”.15 To further 
complicate matters, there was still no agreed definition of an apprenticeship being used 
by the Government or stakeholders (at least four different descriptions were available at 
the time).16 
The Coalition Government appeared to agree with the Committee’s conclusions. In June 
2012 they announced a wide-ranging review of apprenticeships to be led by the 
entrepreneur Doug Richard (the Richard Review).17 It was tasked with ensuring that 
apprenticeships meet the needs of the changing economy, deliver high-quality training and 
maximise the impact of government investment. The Richard Review was convinced that:
…funding is the major lever the Government has to drive change in apprenticeships 
[and] establishing a funding system which incentivises quality, actively encourages 
expansion of apprenticeship opportunities, and drives efficient use of both Government 
and private investment, is an essential underpinning of everything else recommended in 
this report.18 
12  Ibid.
13  Ibid., 34.
14  FE Week, ‘Adult Apprenticeships Benefit from Train to Gain Funding’, FE Week, 28 October 2011.
15  House of Commons Business, Innovation and Skills Committee, Apprenticeships, Fifth Report of Session 2012-13, HC 
83-III (London: The Stationery Office, 2012), 3.
16  Learning and Skills Council, Rapid Review of Research on Apprenticeships, 9.
17  Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, ‘Doug Richard to Lead Government Apprenticeships Review’, Press 
release, 11 June 2012.
18  Doug Richard, The Richard Review of Apprenticeships (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2012), 106. 
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After numerous discussions about how to fund apprenticeships in future, the 
‘apprenticeship levy’ was announced in March 2015 and was expected to raise £3 billion 
per annum by 2019-20.19 Shortly afterwards, the 2015 Conservative Party election 
manifesto committed them to delivering 3 million apprenticeship starts between 2015 and 
2020, and this target officially remains in place today. With the apprenticeship levy having 
come into force in April 2017, the Government also published a ‘Social Mobility Strategy’ 
in December last year which declared that “apprenticeships can transform the lives of 
young people who secure them” and emphasised that apprenticeships should offer “a 
structured and substantial transition for young people from education to work”.20 To 
achieve this, the Strategy claimed the levy would “incentivise more employers to provide 
quality apprenticeships”21 and there would be “a crucial role for Small- and Medium–Sized 
Enterprises (SMEs) in delivering the skills revolution that we need”.22 
This report will analyse the impact of the changes made to apprenticeships in recent 
years; more specifically, the effect of the apprenticeship levy on learners, employers and 
providers. Although the levy is a relatively new part of the education and training 
landscape, the evidence available thus far – combined with a detailed understanding of 
past mistakes in reforming apprenticeships – raises serious concerns about the integrity 
and value-for-money of apprenticeships in this country. As will become clear throughout 
this report, the apprenticeship levy and its supporting systems have led to a series of 
unintended consequences that, if left unchecked, could diminish the overall quality and 
brand of the apprenticeship programme.
19  HM Treasury, Spending Review and Autumn Statement 2015, 2015, 45.
20  Department for Education, Unlocking Talent, Fulfilling Potential: A Plan for Improving Social Mobility through Education, 
2017, 25.
21  Ibid.
22  Ibid., 31.
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The levy formally came into force on 6th April 2017. To assess the impact of the levy, the 
first consideration is whether there has been a rise or fall in the number of people starting 
an apprenticeship since its introduction. After explaining how the levy works in practice, 
this chapter will explore the data published by the Government on the number of 
‘apprenticeship starts’ since April last year as well as analysing the ages of those starting 
their training and the level at which people are training.
1.1 How the apprenticeship levy works
Any organisation with an annual wage bill of over £3 million23 (approximately 2 per cent of 
all employers) must report and pay their levy – at a rate of 0.5 per cent of their pay bill – to 
HMRC through the PAYE system. This applies to employers in all sectors, including public 
sector bodies and charities. Each of these employers has access to a ‘digital account’ 
with HMRC that holds their levy contribution, which is updated on a monthly basis and 
includes a 10 per cent top-up to their accounts provided by government. The funds stay 
in an employer’s digital account for up to two years before they expire. Once an employer 
decides to take on an apprentice, there are a number of steps required for them to draw 
down their levy funds: 
1 The employer chooses which ‘apprenticeship standard’ (i.e. training course) they 
want their apprentice to work towards. 
2 The employer selects a ‘training provider’ from a list of organisations approved by the 
Education and Skills Funding Agency (ESFA).
3 The employer also selects an ‘assessment organisation’ approved by the ESFA to 
carry out the final assessment at the end of the apprenticeship.
4 The employer and the training provider agree a price for each apprenticeship, which 
includes the costs of training and assessment.
5 The employer pays for training and assessment with funds through their digital account.
Each apprenticeship standard is placed into one of 15 funding bands, with the upper limit 
of those bands ranging from £1,500 to £27,000. These bands were introduced by the 
Government as “setting an upper limit on the amount spent on an individual 
apprenticeship ensures that public money is spent in an appropriate way and achieves 
maximum value for the taxpayer.”24 In line with the Richard Review, the government 
guidance for levy-paying employers also maintained that they “are expected to negotiate 
a price for their apprentice’s training and assessment.”25 
If an employer does not pay the levy then they must still choose an apprenticeship 
standard, training provider and assessment organisation. However, the absence of a 
digital account means that they simply pay a ‘co-investment’ of 10 per cent towards 
whatever price they negotiate with the providers and the Government will then directly pay 
the provider the remaining 90 per cent. The same applies to a levy-paying employer who 
has used up all of their levy funds in a given month.
The levy system has other nuances. For example, employers with fewer than 50 people 
can train 16 to 18-year-old apprentices or those aged 19 to 24 who have previously been 
in care or have a Local Authority Education, Health and Care (EHC) plan without paying 
the 10 per cent co-investment – meaning that the Government foots the whole training 
bill. Employers who take on apprentices aged 16 to 18 receive £1,000 to help meet the 
extra costs involved while training providers also receive the same £1,000 payment for 
supporting apprentices who are aged 16 to 18 or aged 19 to 24 and are either a care 
leaver or have a Local Authority EHC plan.
23  This includes employers that are connected to companies or charities for Employment Allowance which in total have an 
annual pay bill of more than £3 million.
24  Department for Education, Apprenticeship Funding: Apprenticeship Funding in England from May 2017, 2016, 10.
25  Ibid.
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1.2 Falling apprenticeship starts
Government statistics show that the number of people starting an apprenticeship from 
May 2017 to October 2017 (the 6-month period after the levy was introduced) was 
162,400 – over 40 per cent lower than the same period in the previous year. Figure 2 
shows the number of apprenticeship starts in the comparable May-October period in 
each year since 2013.26
Figure 2: Number of people starting an apprenticeship in the same 6-month period 
as the statistics on the levy
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Source: Department for Education, Statistics: further education and skills, 2013-2018.
The Department for Education (DfE) has also begun publishing monthly updates on the 
number of apprenticeship starts since the quarterly data covering the period from May to 
October 2017 was released. The most recent figures fared little better than the previous 
six months. In November 2017 27,000 learners started an apprenticeship compared to 
41,600 starts in November 2016,27 while in December 2017 there were 16,700 
apprenticeship starts compared to 21,600 starts in December 2016.28 
Even before these figures were released, warning signs had emerged elsewhere. In 
September 2017, a survey of more than 1,400 companies found that nearly a quarter of 
those paying the levy had no understanding of it or no sense of how their company would 
respond to it, and more than half of them said that it represented merely an additional 
cost with 56 per cent not expecting to recover any or only a part of their levy funds.29 In 
terms of the likely impact on employer behaviour, a survey of more than 1,000 
organisations in January 2018 found that:
 > 46 per cent of levy-paying employers think that the levy will encourage their 
organisation to rebadge current training activity in order to claim back their 
allowance.
26  For each of the years displayed, Figure 2 combines the final figure for apprenticeship starts from Q4 (May-July) with the 
provisional figure for apprenticeship starts for Q1 (August-October).
27  Department for Education, ‘Apprenticeship and Levy Statistics: February 2018’, Webpage, 28 February 2018.
28  Department for Education, ‘Apprenticeship and Levy Statistics: March 2018’, Webpage, 29 March 2018.
29  Sarah Gordon, ‘Apprenticeship Levy Leaves Businesses Baffled’, Financial Times, 27 September 2017.
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 > 40 per cent of levy-paying employers said it will make little or no difference to the 
amount of training they offer.
 > 35 per cent of employers will be more likely to offer apprenticeships to existing 
employees instead of new recruits.
 > 26 per cent of levy-paying employers said it will mean their organisation reduces 
investment in other areas of workforce training and development.
 > 19 per cent of levy-paying employers, including 35 per cent of SMEs, will simply 
write it off as a tax.30
This indicates that, rather than investing in high-quality apprenticeships for young people 
that aim to train them in a new and skilled occupation, employers were already planning 
to react to the levy in a very different manner (or perhaps not respond at all).
1.3 Changing patterns in the level and age of apprentices
The response from employers is also beginning to change the profile of who starts an 
apprenticeship. Apprenticeships are almost exclusively offered to young people in other 
countries such as Germany, Switzerland, Austria and France because it is widely 
understood that apprenticeships are a form of initial vocational training to help a young 
person enter an occupation.31 In this country the decision to offer apprenticeships to 
those aged 25 and over from 2004 onwards did not have a noticeable impact at the 
outset. By 2007 there were still only 300 adult learners starting an apprenticeship each 
year.32 Subsequently, as discussed earlier, there was a sharp increase in the number of 
adult apprentices (amplified by the transfer of learners from the ‘Train to Gain’ scheme 
that was being closed down). In every year since 2011, the number of learners aged 25 
and over starting an apprenticeship has been higher than the number of starts among 
those aged under 19 – with adult apprenticeships peaking at 230,300 in 2013.33 Far from 
addressing this lack of focus on young people in the apprenticeship programme, the levy 
appears to be compounding it.
During 2014 and 2015, the delivery of the new wave of ‘apprenticeship standards’ 
designed by groups of employers - describing the skills, knowledge and behaviours that 
an apprentice is expected to acquire during their training34 - was initially concentrated on 
younger age groups. The latest statistics suggest that this is an evolving picture as 
employers switch their attention to older age groups instead. In the six months of full data 
available since the levy began operating in April 2017, the age category with the highest 
number of people starting to train towards one of the new ‘apprenticeship standards’ is 
the over-25s (See Figure 335). 
30  Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, ‘More than Half of Employers Currently Paying the Apprenticeship 
Levy Want It Replaced with a Training Levy’, Press release, 11 January 2018.
31  Hilary Steedman, The State of Apprenticeship in 2010 (The Centre for Economic Performance, 2010).
32  Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Quarterly Statistical First Release - Post-16 Education & Skills: Learner 
Participation, Outcomes and Level of Highest Qualification Held.
33  Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Statistical First Release - Further Education & Skills: Learner 
Participation, Outcomes and Level of Highest Qualification Held, 2014.
34  Institute for Apprenticeships, ‘How to Develop an Apprenticeship Standard: Guide for Trailblazers’, Webpage, 7 
November 2017.
35  Figure 3 combines the final figure for apprenticeship starts from Q4 (May-July) with the provisional figure for 
apprenticeship starts for Q1 (August-October).
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Figure 3: Ages of people starting training towards a new ‘apprenticeship standard’ 
since the levy was introduced (May to October 2017)
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Source: Department for Education, FE data library: apprenticeships, 2018.
In addition to older age groups becoming the focus, Figure 4 shows that the mix of 
apprenticeship levels is shifting from Intermediate (Level 2) towards Higher and Degree 
Apprenticeships (Levels 4-6; equivalent to the first year of university through to a full 
degree). In established apprenticeship systems such as Germany, Switzerland and 
Austria, almost all apprenticeships are at Level 3 because the training is designed to 
ensure apprentices become fully competent in their occupation rather than providing 
training at higher levels to those already in work.36 The proportion of apprenticeships in 
this country being delivered at higher levels (Level 4+) has grown markedly since the levy 
was introduced, but just 12 per cent of these have been delivered to those aged under 
19. This suggests that more experienced workers are increasingly becoming the focus of 
the apprenticeship programme, at the expense of less experienced employees.
36  Steedman, The State of Apprenticeship in 2010.
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Figure	4:	Proportion	of	apprenticeship	starts	at	different	levels	before	and	after	the	
levy was introduced
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Source: Department for Education, FE data library: apprenticeships, 2018.
The changing mix of ages and levels in the statistics on apprenticeship starts are both in 
line with the aforementioned survey findings that suggested many employers will seek to 
use existing and/or older employees and rebadged training schemes to draw down their 
levy funds instead of recruiting new and typically younger people. By 2020 all 
apprenticeships will be delivered using these new ‘standards’,37 which serves to highlight 
their importance as an indicator of how the levy is likely to affect opportunities for young 
people.
Furthermore, the extent to which government funding generates outcomes that are not 
additional to what would have occurred in the absence of such funding, also known as 
‘deadweight’, looms large. Before the levy was introduced, apprentices aged 19 and over 
typically attracted a subsidy of around 50 per cent for their training costs while 
apprentices aged under 19 attracted a subsidy of 100 per cent. This has now altered so 
that, while those aged under 19 can still attract the full subsidy, apprentices aged 19 and 
over are now subsidised to the tune of 90 per cent of the training costs (the employer 
co-investment rate of 10 per cent covers the remaining portion). This introduces a 
sizeable incentive for employers to start training older apprentices, including existing 
employees, that goes well beyond the subsidies available before the levy was rolled out.
1.4 The role of the 3 million target
Politicians from all parties are right to demand a better technical education system in this 
country, but the apparent targeting of the quantity of apprenticeships rather than the 
quality and substance of what is being delivered is the wrong approach. As described in 
this chapter, the overall quantity of apprenticeships has fallen and the mixture of the ages 
and levels of apprenticeships is also changing. The target of 3 million apprenticeship 
starts by 2020 creates a situation in which the need to support young people into 
apprenticeships at a suitable level is no longer formally prioritised by the Government. 
Likewise, the apprenticeship levy is now expected to help deliver more apprenticeship 
starts in an effort to hit the 3 million target even if those additional apprenticeships are 
37  Department for Education, ‘Removal of Apprenticeship Frameworks’, Webpage, 24 January 2018.
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disproportionately taken by older and existing workers.
When the commitment to 3 million apprenticeships by 2020 was first announced, 
Professor Alison Wolf – author of a major government review of vocational education in 
2011 – described it as a “mad and artificial political target which risks undermining the 
reputation of apprenticeships”.38 The NAO subsequently pointed out that the target would 
not tackle skills gaps or improve outcomes for learners,39 while the Institute for Fiscal 
Studies stated last year that “a stronger focus on quality and a policy designed to 
maximise impact rather than numbers” was needed instead.40
The 3 million apprenticeship target is not responsible for every problem facing the 
apprenticeship levy and its associated reforms described in this report. It is nevertheless 
driving employers and training providers to accelerate the delivery of new apprenticeship 
standards before a solid foundation has been placed underneath the reform programme 
as a whole – particularly, as this report argues, in terms of apprenticeship quality (see 
chapter 3) and the validity and reliability of apprenticeship assessments (see chapter 5).
To this day, no research evidence has been published by the Government to support the 
notion that 600,000 apprenticeship starts per year from 2015 to 2020 is appropriate for 
the economy. Moreover, the incentives that the target has introduced into the 
apprenticeship system for employers, training providers and assessors will undermine any 
attempt to either improve the quality and stature of apprenticeships in this country or 
generate more opportunities for young people to enter skilled occupations. 
Recommendation 1: The target for 3 million apprenticeship starts by 2020 should be 
abandoned so that the focus can be placed on apprenticeship quality above all else.
38  Oliver Wright, ‘’Mad’ Apprenticeship Targets Have Consigned a Generation to Low-Skill, Low-Paid Duties’, The 
Independent, 30 August 2015.
39  National Audit Office, Delivering Value through the Apprenticeships Programme, 2016, 22.
40  Neil Amin-Smith, Jonathan Cribb, and Luke Sibieta, Reforms to Apprenticeship Funding in England (Institute for Fiscal 
Studies, 2017), 29.
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Having considered the number of people starting an apprenticeship since the levy was 
introduced, it is also important to assess the quality of the apprenticeships that those 
same individuals have embarked on. This chapter will investigate the characteristics of a 
high-quality apprenticeship and the extent to which these characteristics are reflected in 
the apprenticeships being delivered to learners.
2.1	Exploiting	the	weak	definition	of	an	‘apprenticeship’
Apprenticeships are a global and established brand. The International Labour Office (ILO) 
defines apprenticeships as “training programmes that combine vocational education with 
work-based learning for an intermediate occupational skill (i.e. more than routinised job 
training)”.41 The ILO definition also incorporates other key features of an apprenticeship 
such as their focus on training young people and that this training involves a long-term 
and ‘systematic’ (i.e. predefined) programme of learning.42 
The Richard Review in 2012 voiced concerns that the definition of an ‘apprenticeship’ in 
this country was being stretched too far, stating that “there has been a drift towards 
calling many things apprenticeships which, in fact, are not.”43 It also insisted that 
“increasing the skills of people within an existing job” was not an apprenticeship.44 The 
‘quality statement’ published in November 2017 by the Institute for Apprenticeships (IfA), 
a new government agency introduced alongside the levy, echoed these sentiments:
Not all training is an apprenticeship. Work experience alone, shorter duration training 
for a job, attending a course, or assessing and certificating an employee who is 
already working in the occupation, are all positive forms of learning and accreditation 
at work but they are not apprenticeships.45
Back in 2013, the Government had sought to explain what it meant by the term 
‘apprenticeship’ (see box below). 
What is an Apprenticeship?
An Apprenticeship is a job that requires substantial and sustained training, leading to the 
achievement of an Apprenticeship standard and the development of transferable skills.
This definition is underpinned by four principles of future Apprenticeships:
 > An Apprenticeship is a job, in a skilled occupation
 > An Apprenticeship requires substantial and sustained training, lasting a minimum of 
12 months and including off-the-job training
 > An Apprenticeship leads to full competency in an occupation, demonstrated by the 
achievement of an Apprenticeship standard that is defined by employers and
 > An Apprenticeship develops transferable skills, including English and maths, to 
progress careers.
Source: HM Government, The Future of Apprenticeships in England: Implementation  
Plan, 2013.
The gap between the Government’s definition and that of the ILO was striking. For the 
Government to propose that any ‘job with training’ could be classed as an apprenticeship 
directly conflicted with the ILO’s view. A precise description of what constituted a ‘skilled 
occupation’ was absent, as was any mention of the need for a ‘systematic’ training plan 
41  Hilary Steedman, Overview of Apprenticeship Systems and Issues: ILO Contribution to the G20 Task Force on 
Employment (International Labour Organisation, 2012), 2–3.
42  Ibid.
43  Richard, The Richard Review of Apprenticeships, 4. 
44  Ibid., 32. 
45  Institute for Apprenticeships, ‘What Is A Quality Apprenticeship’, Webpage, 2017.
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highlighted by the ILO. The Government also decided it was up to employers “to agree 
what constitutes a suitable and discrete occupation.”46 
Having left the definition of an apprenticeship in the hands of employers, the Government 
claimed to only be willing to accept new apprenticeship standards that were “high quality, 
with sufficient content and transferability to justify public investment”.47 This was to be 
achieved through a ‘framework’ of criteria (still largely in place today) against which the 
proposed new apprenticeships put forward by employers would be judged. Nevertheless, 
the phrase ‘skilled occupation’ did not feature in the criteria while the notion of ‘sustained 
training’ was removed in favour of requiring apprenticeships to last just 12 months – well 
below the international benchmark of three years.48
The decision not to adhere to the internationally-recognised definition of an 
apprenticeship has therefore created two problems. First, employers do not have to focus 
on skilled occupations – they merely have to describe any job or role that they wished to 
be labelled as an ‘apprenticeship’. Second, the new apprenticeship standards designed 
by employers do not have to promote long-term or systematic training, even though this 
is regarded as a core feature of apprenticeships in other countries. 
2.2 Low-skill roles being rebadged as ‘apprenticeships’
As part of the Government’s wider package of reforms to apprenticeships, groups of 
employers have come together to write the new ‘apprenticeship standards’. Some 
employers have used this opportunity to generate high-quality standards. However, as will 
be described in this section, other employers appear to be simply rebadging low-quality, 
low-skill and often low-wage roles as ‘apprenticeships’ instead. 
The opening sentence of the ‘Retailer’ apprenticeship standard notes that “the main 
purpose of a retailer is to assist customers when they purchase products and services”.49 
The standard claims that those who complete it can work in a variety of shops and other 
retail establishments including supermarkets, small boutiques, funeral services, garden 
centres, and delicatessens.50 The only way that these different employment contexts 
could be linked is if the training on this ‘apprenticeship’ lacks depth and relates to low-
level responsibilities restricted to basic customer interactions. In 2015, the joint Business, 
Innovation and Skills and Education Select Committees described the significant 
difference between retail apprenticeships in Germany compared to those in England:
In Germany sales assistants are typically responsible for the whole distributive 
process, including ordering, merchandising and advising customers and they do not 
receive daily instructions from superiors. …By contrast, in UK retail firms, work for 
sales assistants is typically divided up into bounded tasks which are relatively easy to 
carry out. Sales staff have limited autonomy and tend to follow day-to-day 
instructions by managers.51
In short, there is a serious risk that those completing a ‘retail’ apprenticeship in England 
end up less skilled, less knowledgeable, less autonomous and with a much narrower 
training scheme than their German counterparts. 
The ‘Hospitality Team Member’ apprenticeship standard takes a similar approach by 
claiming that it encompasses training to work in different venues such as bars, 
restaurants, cafés and hotels across a range of ‘specialist areas’ (e.g. Barista, 
46  HM Government, The Future of Apprenticeships in England: Guidance for Trailblazers (Version 2), 2014, 12.
47  HM Government, The Future of Apprenticeships in England: Implementation Plan, 2013, 12.
48  Steedman, The State of Apprenticeship in 2010, 2.
49  Institute for Apprenticeships, ‘Retailer’, Webpage, 2018.
50  Ibid.
51  House of Commons Business, Innovation and Skills and Education Committees, Education, Skills and Productivity: 
Commissioned Research – First Joint Special Report of the Business, Innovation and Skills and Education Committees 
of Session 2015–16, HC 565 (London: The Stationery Office, 2015), 20.
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Housekeeping, Reception).52 That said, a learner is only trained in one of these specialist 
areas during the 12-month course. The comparison to Germany is again illustrative as their 
‘Hotel Business Specialist’ apprenticeship trains people to work in hotels, guesthouses, 
inns, restaurants, cafes and in catering by delivering a training package that lasts for three 
years rather than 12 months. This single apprenticeship in Germany also covers all of the 
‘specialist areas’ named in the English equivalent as well as training apprentices in a 
much wider range of skills and knowledge such as managing inventories, stock control, 
promotions and marketing, planning employee shifts and handling complaints.53
The ‘Customer Service Practitioner’ standard also fails to meet any reasonable measure 
for high-quality content. The standard merely states that “the role of a customer service 
practitioner is to deliver high quality products and services to the customers of their 
organisation”.54 The core ‘knowledge’ listed in the standard includes statements such as 
“understand who customers are”, “understand your role and responsibility within your 
organisation and the impact of your actions on others” and “understand the products or 
services that are available from your organisation”.55 Useful as these attributes are, they 
do not represent the end-product of a rigorous and substantial training course in a skilled 
occupation. The list of advertisements for ‘Customer Service Practitioner’ training 
vacancies show that learners can end up working at an estate agent, car dealership, 
coffee shop, accountancy firm, distribution firm, medical centre, locksmith, sport centre, 
recruitment firm, pharmacy or a cleaning company.56 This enormous variety of job roles 
further demonstrates how little emphasis the standard places on the level of skill and 
depth of occupational knowledge that would be acquired through this ‘apprenticeship’.
The generic ‘Business Administrator’ standard notes that it gives apprentices “a highly 
transferable set of knowledge, skills and behaviours that can be applied in all sectors.”57 
The core ‘skills’ listed in the standard include the apprentice becoming “skilled in the use 
of multiple IT packages and systems relevant to the organisation” and “[understanding] 
the organisation’s processes, e.g. making payments or processing customer data”,58 
indicating that this apprentice is only learning the processes, procedures and systems 
needed to operate in a specific workplace – not across all industry sectors. The gap 
between this apprenticeship standard and its German equivalent is yet again instructive 
because they offer six different ‘business administrator’ apprenticeships in Germany to 
recognise the need for people to acquire sector-specific skills and knowledge to perform 
such a role effectively.59
The risk with such ill-defined and low-skill roles is that the experience for the apprentices 
does not match the government rhetoric around the value of apprenticeships. For 
example, news reports of ‘Business Administrator’ apprentices being asked to do little 
more than filing, photocopying and answer the phones while being paid below the normal 
minimum wage because they are classed as an ‘apprentice’ are all too common.60 The 
practice of labelling low-skill courses as ‘apprenticeships’ is becoming widespread but 
has not gone entirely unnoticed. In its report on the quality of apprenticeships in 2015 
Ofsted was vocal in its criticism, stating that “employers and providers involved in poor 
52  Institute for Apprenticeships, ‘Hospitality Team Member’, Webpage, 2018. The full list of specialist areas is: ‘Food and 
beverage service’, ‘Barista’, ‘Housekeeping’, ‘Reception’, ‘Reservations’, ‘Concierge and guest services’ and ‘Serving 
alcoholic beverages’ (the latter being further divided into serving beer, wine or cocktails – not all three).
53  Bundesagentur Für Arbeit, ‘Hotelfachmann/-Fachfrau’, Webpage, 2018.
54  Institute for Apprenticeships, ‘Customer Service Practitioner’, Webpage, 2018.
55  Ibid.
56  A search for ‘Customer Service Practitioner’ (Level 2 / Intermediate) roles in England was carried out on the ‘Find an 
apprenticeship’ website in March 2018.
57  Institute for Apprenticeships, ‘Business Administrator’, Webpage, 2018.
58  Ibid.
59  Recognition in Germany, ‘Recognition Finder: Business Administrator’, Webpage, 2018. The full list of Business 
Administrator apprenticeships in Germany is: Automobile business administrator; Business administrator for logistics 
systems; Business administrator for marketing; Business administrator for office and project organisation; Business 
administrator for purchasing; Business administrator for sales and distribution in the retail sector.
60  BBC News, ‘Apprenticeships: “It’s the Money That Puts People Off”’, Webpage, 13 October 2017.
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quality, low-level apprenticeships are wasting public funds and abusing the trust placed in 
them by government and the apprentices.”61 
The proliferation of low-level and low-skill roles being labelled as ‘apprenticeships’ poses 
a further problem. England is one of only a handful of countries to offer apprenticeships at 
both Level 2 (equivalent to GCSEs) and Level 3 (equivalent to A-levels) instead of just the 
widely-recognised international benchmark of Level 3. There are now several examples of 
‘vertical differentiation’62 (i.e. splitting an occupation into training courses at higher and 
lower levels) that have generated groups of new apprenticeship standards containing 
almost identical descriptions of a role at both Level 2 and Level 3 and sometimes even 
Level 4 (equivalent to the first year of a degree). For instance, the ‘Investment Operations 
Administrator’ standard sits at Level 2 while ‘Investment Operations Technician’ is at Level 
3 and ‘Investment Operations Specialist’ is at Level 4, even though the Level 3 version 
describes itself as an “entry level role”. Similarly, there are separate standards for ‘Rail 
Engineering Operative’, ‘Rail Engineering Technician’ and ‘Rail Engineering Advanced 
Technician’ that span Levels 2, 3 and 4 respectively. The same pattern is evident yet again 
with the standards for ‘Housing/Property Management Assistant’, ‘Housing/Property 
Management’ and ‘Senior Housing/Property Management’. 
Such practices contradict the requirements laid out by the IfA, which states in its 
guidance that an apprenticeship occupation must “cover a recognised stand-alone 
occupation, for which there is a genuine demand in the job market” and “be one for which 
someone can achieve full competence without the need for further training beyond the 
apprenticeship.”63 Producing two or three versions of the same apprenticeship indicates 
that at least one of them is unnecessary as it does not represent the level of skill and 
knowledge required to enter an occupation. Nonetheless, the availability of substantial 
government subsidies for anything badged as an ‘apprenticeship’ means that employers 
are being driven to create these duplicate roles irrespective of their value or relevance in 
the labour market.
2.3 Professional development courses being labelled as 
‘apprenticeships’
A central point made in the Richard Review was that increasing the skills of people within 
an existing job should not be viewed as an apprenticeship. The use of the apprenticeship 
brand to cover supervisory or management positions does not meet the Government’s 
description of an apprenticeship, the Richard Review’s perspective or the ILO definition, 
yet these ‘apprenticeships’ account for a large proportion of the new apprenticeship 
standards. Given the 90 per cent subsidy available for any course or programme that is 
designated as an apprenticeship, even at managerial levels, employers are now actively 
incentivised to relabel training courses as ‘apprenticeships’ that they previously paid for 
themselves. Accordingly, the deadweight costs of this activity could be extremely high. 
The National Audit Office (NAO) had previously warned in September 2016 that 
“employers might artificially route other forms of training into apprenticeships”.64 
The list of approved apprenticeship standards contains numerous professional 
development opportunities for those already in a job, such as ‘Early Years Centre Leader’, 
‘Golf Course Manager’, ‘Hospitality Manager’ and ‘Retail Manager’. Perhaps the most 
obvious example of relabelling professional development courses is the ‘Chartered 
Manager Degree Apprenticeship’. Management courses are a form of professional 
development – not training for a discrete occupation. One of the key organisations behind 
this standard – the Chartered Management Institute (CMI) – found in its own survey of 
61  Ofsted, Apprenticeships: Developing Skills for Future Prosperity, 2015, 5.
62  Lorna Unwin and Alison Fuller, Apprenticeship and the Concept of Occupation (The Gatsby Charitable Foundation, 
2013), 26. 
63  Institute for Apprenticeships, ‘How to’ Guide for Trailblazers, 2017, 9.
64  National Audit Office, Delivering Value through the Apprenticeships Programme, 40.
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managers seeking ‘chartered’ status back in 2015 that the three most common reasons 
for training to become a ‘Chartered Manager’ were “to demonstrate my continued 
professional development”, “to gain professional recognition” and “to demonstrate my 
commitment to management as a profession”.65 
The brochure containing this survey included a quote from a manager at another 
organisation involved in developing the new standard, which stated that the existing 
Chartered Manager qualification “is an essential part of the company’s management and 
leadership training programme”.66 This manager’s company “saw the accreditation [of 
becoming a Chartered Manager] as being something positive to include in tenders for 
new contracts [as] they recognised that Chartered Manager shows the client the 
capability and adaptability of the senior management team working on the contract.”67 
This makes it clear that such companies were willing and able to pay for management 
training at this level before the degree apprenticeship was invented because it could give 
them a commercial advantage. The CMI claim that Chartered Managers add £391,443 of 
value to their employer,68 which would explain why employers seemed willing to cover the 
cost of the training themselves. Following the decision to approve this new standard, the 
Government now funds this management ‘apprenticeship’ instead at up to £27,000 for 
everyone who enrols on the course.
The same group of employers behind the Chartered Manager scheme have also designed 
an apprenticeship standard called ‘Team Leader / Supervisor’. It is described as “a first 
line management role” and includes training in areas such as ‘team management’, 
‘financial management’, ‘project management’, ‘leadership’, ‘communication’ and 
‘performance management’. This bears a striking resemblance to the ‘First Line 
Management’ Level 3 qualification offered at present by the CMI outside of 
apprenticeships (and funded by employers), which includes training in ‘managing and 
communicating information, ‘improving team performance’, ‘being a leader’, 
‘understanding team dynamics’ and ‘leadership influencing skills’.69 Now that this too has 
been relabelled as an ‘apprenticeship’, it commands a government contribution of up to 
£5,000 for each person enrolled on the course.
To further demonstrate the power of the 90 per cent government subsidy introduced by 
the levy, these same employers have recently produced a ‘Senior Leader Masters Degree 
Apprenticeship’ aimed at Chief Executives, Chief Financial Officers and Chief Operating 
Officers amongst others. Cranfield University’s School of Management – one of the most 
prestigious management schools in the country – state on their website that their existing 
‘Executive MBA’ programme is “for middle managers wanting to move into a senior 
management role and those on a fast-track career path within their organisations”.70 This 
MBA has now been “designed to meet the requirements” of the new ‘Senior Leader’ 
apprenticeship.71 If anyone wishes to pay for this Executive MBA independently, it would 
cost them or their employer £32,000 to start in April 2018. Now that this course is set to 
be absorbed into the new ‘senior leader’ apprenticeship, non-levy paying employers will 
be able to claim a 90 per cent subsidy from government towards the cost of the external 
training instead. The Financial Times recently reported that “British business schools 
cannot believe their good fortune as companies look to use the levy to send executives 
on MBA courses” and the article quoted Paul Baines, MBA course director at Cranfield 
University, as saying “the apprenticeship levy creates a new opportunity for us”.72
65  Patrick Woodman, Lysbeth Plas, and Tristan Garrick, Mapping Management Excellence: Evaluating the Impact of 
Chartered Manager (Chartered Management Institute, 2015), 9. 
66  Ibid., 16. 
67  Ibid.
68  Ibid., 15.
69  Chartered Management Institute, ‘CMI Level 3 - First Line Management’, Webpage, 2018.
70  Cranfield School Of Management, ‘Executive MBA’, Webpage, 2018.
71  Ibid.
72  Jonathan Moules, ‘MBA Students Become Unlikely Beneficiaries of UK Apprenticeship Levy’, Financial Times, 6 
October 2017.
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2.4	The	financial	consequences	of	failing	to	protect	quality
The impact on the public finances of allowing employers to label almost anything they 
wish as an ‘apprenticeship’ should not be underestimated. The latest government 
statistics on the number of people starting apprenticeships on the new employer-
designed standards73 show how much money is at risk.
When combined, the ‘Retailer’, ‘Customer Service Practitioner’, ‘Hospitality Team 
Member’ and ‘Business Administrator’ roles already account for 14 per cent of the people 
training towards any apprenticeship standard in any sector. The two professional 
development courses described earlier (‘Chartered Manager Degree Apprenticeship’ and 
‘Team Leader / Supervisor’) account for a further 10 per cent of the people starting any 
apprenticeship. This means that these six standards alone – all of which fail to meet the 
historical and international definition of an apprenticeship – account for almost 25 per 
cent of all apprenticeship starts on the new standards. 
Figure 5: Most popular apprenticeship standards according to the percentage of 
starts on the new standards
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Installation/Maintenance Electrician
Team Leader/Supervisor
Customer Service Practitioner
Hair Professional
Retailer
Engineering Technician
Assistant Accountant
Infrastructure Technician
Operations/Departmental Manager
Hospitality Team Member
Professional Accounting
Taxation Technician
Adult Care Worker
Chartered Manager
Degree Apprenticeship
Retail Team Leader
Digital and Technology
Solutions Professional
Hospitality Supervisor
Lead Adult Care Worker
Name of apprenticeship standard 
Percentage of starts on new standards
Source: Department for Education, FE data library: apprenticeships, 2018.
Figure 5 demonstrates how entrenched these inappropriately labelled ‘apprenticeships’ 
have already become. Looking across other apprenticeship standards that cover either 
low-skill training courses, duplicated roles across multiple levels or professional 
development courses (see Appendix for the full list) they together represent 37 per cent of 
the people training towards any apprenticeship standard.74 There is no reason why this 
73  Department for Education, ‘FE Data Library: Apprenticeships’, Webpage, 25 January 2018. The statistics quoted in this 
section refer to total starts on the apprenticeship standards in programme year 2016/17 and the first quarter of 2017/18.
74  This was calculated by analysing the content, entry point and international equivalents of all the apprenticeship 
standards that had recorded apprenticeship starts since 2016. The final number was produced by counting any 
apprenticeship standard that either: (a) covered a role that offered low-level training and fell short of occupational 
competence or was not specific to a skilled occupation; (b) covered a role where there was a directly-equivalent 
standard in the same occupation at a higher or lower level, in which case only one of those standard was accepted; or 
(c) described a professional development course for someone who had already acquired significant experience in the 
workplace before being allowed to commence the apprenticeship.
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could not climb even higher as employers are still able to propose what should be labelled 
or rebadged as an ‘apprenticeship’. 
The latest figures from the Office for Budget Responsibility have revised the expected levy 
receipts from the original estimate of £3 billion down to £2.7 billion per annum by 2019-
20.75 The apprenticeship standards that cover low-skill training courses, duplicated roles 
across multiple levels and professional development courses have accounted for 22 per 
cent of the funding attached to the new standards over the past two years. If this trend 
continues, the Government will be spending almost £600 million per annum by 2019-20 
on training courses that have been incorrectly labelled as ‘apprenticeships’.76
2.5 Addressing concerns over apprenticeship quality
Employers and training providers have been given access to hundreds of millions of 
pounds in government subsidies so long as whatever they deliver has been labelled as an 
‘apprenticeship’. It is therefore essential that, for the first time in years, the Government 
builds a strong platform underneath their levy reforms by taking a robust and unequivocal 
stance on what should and should not be classified as an apprenticeship. 
In a recent OECD report on the costs and benefits of apprenticeships, they noted that 
respected apprenticeship systems such as Austria, Germany, Canada and Norway do not 
even entertain the idea that you can have apprenticeships in anything other than skilled or 
highly-skilled roles. The report added that:
…apprentices who undertake only unskilled work learn few new skills …[and] in these 
circumstances, there may be a high dropout rate from apprenticeship programmes, 
and students will tend to shun apprenticeships. In the long run, even just a small 
proportion of low-quality apprenticeships can damage the overall reputation and 
‘brand’ of apprenticeships.77 
Allowing employers to decide for themselves what they wish to be labelled an 
‘apprenticeship’ was never, and will never, be an appropriate solution because employers’ 
incentives are not properly aligned with the needs of apprentices and society as a whole. 
Instead, the following definition – which builds on the work of the ILO and OECD – would 
provide a more rigorous and stable foundation for apprenticeships in this country:
Proposed	new	definition	of	an	apprenticeship
‘Apprenticeship’ refers to an education and training programme that combines vocational 
education with work-based learning in relation to entry into a new skilled occupation or 
trade. It follows a systematic programme that utilises both on- and off-the-job training. On 
completing an apprenticeship, the apprentice will be fully competent in their occupation, 
which means that they will be able to: 
 > Operate independently in the workplace.
 > Take responsibility for initiating and completing tasks and procedures.
 > Use their factual, procedural and theoretical understanding to complete tasks and 
address problems.
 > Exercise autonomy and sound judgement to deliver complex and non-routine work.
 > Investigate and review the methods used by them and others in the workplace.
75  Office for Budget Responsibility, Economic and Fiscal Outlook, 2018, 104.
76  This figure was calculated by first multiplying the number of apprenticeship starts in 2016/17 and 2017/18 on each 
standard by the maximum funding band allocation for those standards to create a total of the funding allocated to 
learners on each standard so far. Next, the total funding allocated to each standard was added together to generate the 
total funding allocated to all standards. Next, the proportion of this total funding allocation accounted for by each 
individual standard could be calculated. The sum of the proportions of funding allocated to apprenticeship standards 
that cover low-skill training courses, duplicated roles across multiple levels or professional development courses is 
21.71 per cent, representing a total of £586,259,781 of the £2.7 billion levy receipts expected by 2019-20.
77  Malgorzata Kuczera, Striking the Right Balance: Costs and Benefits of Apprenticeship (OECD, 2017), 30.
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This new definition would make a significant contribution to preventing the possible 
misuse of the apprenticeship brand by employers and training providers. Any standard 
that is not able to meet this definition should be withdrawn immediately and either revised 
or discarded accordingly in order to protect apprentices and taxpayers. Professional 
development courses that are not related to acquiring initial occupational competence 
would not be acceptable, while low-skill roles would also be rejected because they do not 
support an apprentice to reach a sufficiently high level of competence, responsibility and 
autonomy in the workplace. There is nothing wrong in principle with apprenticeships 
being offered at both lower or higher levels, which is why it is better to focus on the rigour, 
depth and breadth of the training course rather than worrying unduly about which level it 
is associated with. 
Recommendation 2: The Government should introduce a new internationally-
benchmarked definition of an ‘apprenticeship’ and any apprenticeship standard that does 
not meet this definition should be withdrawn. 
Far from representing a departure from current government policy, this recommendation 
fits squarely with the views of the expert panel led by Lord Sainsbury that was established 
in November 2015 by then Minister for Skills Nick Boles (with strong endorsement from 
the Prime Minister David Cameron). The panel were asked to advise ministers on 
measures that could improve technical education in England. Their final report in April 
2016 made the following observation about the quality of apprenticeship standards:
…[we are] concerned that some existing apprenticeship standards, at least at face 
value, seem to overlap significantly with others, be firm- rather than occupation-
specific, and/or contain insufficient technical content. If this is indeed the case, it risks 
a proliferation of low-value or niche standards, creating complexity and recreating all 
the problems of the previous system.78
The panel recommended that “at the earliest opportunity, the Institute for Apprenticeships 
reviews all existing apprenticeship standards to satisfy itself that there is no substantial 
overlap between standards, and that every standard is occupation rather than firm-
specific and contains sufficient technical content to warrant at least 20% off-the-job 
training.”79 Following this review, the panel advised that “standards found to be 
overlapping or wanting in terms of breadth or technical content should be revised, 
consolidated or withdrawn.”80
Two years later the IfA has still not carried out this review, despite the Government saying 
at the time that “we accept and will implement all of the Sainsbury panel’s proposals, 
unequivocally”.81 This review of existing standards, if it is based around the new definition 
of an apprenticeship outlined above, would protect the apprenticeship brand from further 
damage and strengthen the quality of apprenticeships in future.
78  David Sainsbury et al., Report of the Independent Panel on Technical Education (Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills and Department for Education, 2016), 41.
79  Ibid., 42.
80  Ibid.
81  Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and Department for Education, Post-16 Skills Plan, 2016, 6.
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Maintaining the support of the business community for any major reforms to 
apprenticeships is vital, yet business leaders have expressed serious misgivings in recent 
months about the apprenticeship levy. 
In January 2018 Steve Nash, Chief Executive of the Institute of the Motor Industry, said 
that the slump in apprenticeship starts under the levy was caused by “a combination of 
confusion amongst employers about the new processes [and] reluctance by smaller 
employers to take on what they see as an increased administrative burden”.82 In February 
2018 Dame Judith Hackitt, chair of the EEF manufacturing group, described the levy’s 
impact on employers as “disastrous” because “it is complex, companies are unable to 
access their funds and many view it as another tax on business.”83 Such is the degree of 
complexity and bureaucracy associated with the apprenticeship levy, she added that 
employers were “near breaking point” and consequently the Government must “rethink 
the entire levy system from top to bottom.”84 In March 2018 the CBI business group said 
that the apprenticeship levy is ‘broken’ and the Government must go back to the drawing 
board.85
While it may be tempting to dismiss such concerns on the grounds that some 
organisations could be unhappy with having to pay the levy, the reality is far more 
complicated. The difficulties facing employers of all sizes since the introduction of the levy 
can in fact be traced back to the very beginning of the reforms. 
3.1 The funding proposals in the Richard Review
The Richard Review articulated the view - shared by many at the time - that the funding 
model for delivering apprenticeships “drives a system which is too provider-driven and not 
sufficiently responsive to employers”.86 The proposed solution was that government 
should contribute to the cost of training apprentices but “the purchasing power for 
training must lie firmly in the hands of employers” as “employers are best placed to judge 
the quality and relevance of training and demand the highest possible standards from 
training organisations”.87 This proved more popular among employers than the Richard 
Review’s following recommendation that they should be forced to make financial 
contributions to the cost of training over and above paying their apprentices’ wages. This 
was deemed necessary to make employers “demand the highest quality and most 
cost-effective training.”88 
The Review’s preferred approach to achieving this was that government should fund 
apprenticeships through National Insurance or the tax system – ideally through a tax 
credit (based on the R&D tax credit already in operation). More generally, the Review 
wanted the funding system to be simple and accessible, particularly for small firms, and 
that government should consider varying how much it pays for training according to the 
size of the firm and the age of the apprentice.89 
3.2 Research evidence on the Richard Review proposals
Some of the Review’s proposals looked questionable from the outset. A government 
survey of the employers of apprentices, published shortly before the Review, found that 
over 80 per cent of employers were ‘satisfied’ or ‘very satisfied’ with the quality of training 
delivered by their external training provider, the relevance of that training to their needs 
82  Tom Sharpe, ‘Increased Administrative Burden of Apprenticeship Levy Blamed for 26.5% Decline in New Starters’, 
Automotive Management Online, 30 January 2018.
83  George Ryan, ‘Employers “Near Breaking Point” Thanks to Apprenticeship Levy, Says Industry Leader’, Times 
Education Supplement, 20 February 2018.
84  Ibid.
85  Robert Lea, ‘Broken Apprentice Levy Can’t Be Fixed, Says CBI’, The Times, 23 March 2018.
86  Richard, The Richard Review of Apprenticeships, 107. 
87  Ibid., 100.
88  Ibid., 108. 
89  Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, The Future of Apprenticeships in England: Next Steps from the Richard 
Review, 2013, 24.
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and the support and communication they received. The vast majority of employers also 
felt able to influence the structure, content and delivery of the external training.90 For the 
Review to propose that employers wanted, and needed, more responsibility for organising 
and overseeing training provision appeared wide of the mark. 
Furthermore, the same survey found that only 11 per cent of employers paid any financial 
contribution to the training provider for their apprentices, and of that 11 per cent only half 
paid more than £1,000.91 Of those employers who paid a contribution, 35 per cent said 
that they took on fewer apprentices as a result.92 This shows that as far back as 2012 it 
was clear employers would be sensitive to demands for cash contributions. As described 
in an OECD report last year, the costs to employers of an apprenticeship are significant, 
with the largest being the apprentice’s wages (plus social security and travel costs) 
followed by the cost of instructors or trainers in the workplace, tools and equipment and 
finally administration.93 The same report pointed out that employers “will offer 
apprenticeships if the expected benefits are more than, or at least equal to, the expected 
costs”.94 Conversely, if the costs are too high then employers may simply walk away. 
Demanding cash contributions also diverged from the approach taken in other countries, 
where employers often get paid by the government to take on apprentices. For example, 
in Austria companies have received government grants for each apprentice since 2008 
equivalent to as much as three times an apprentice’s gross wages. In France, 
organisations employing apprentices for at least one month can benefit from a tax credit 
of €1,600 per apprentice per year. In the Netherlands, a subsidy for employers was 
introduced in 2014 of up to €2,700 per apprentice per year.95
The Richard Review recognised that enforced contributions might affect employer’s 
willingness to offer apprenticeships noting that “the funding system should encourage and 
not deter employers from participating – particularly recognising that today many receive 
apprenticeship training as a free good.”96 To resolve this, the Review proposed that “the 
Government could be more generous in other respects, for example [it] could offset or 
partly offset employers’ contributions to training, by reimbursing part of the cost of internal 
training or even a proportion of the wage costs. Therefore, it should be possible to ensure 
that overall, employers are not worse off”.97
3.3 The journey towards the apprenticeship levy
Following the Review, the Government set out to deliver its vision of employer co-
investment coupled with government funding. Four different funding models were put 
forward across two large-scale consultations throughout 2013 and 2014, which triggered 
hundreds of responses from stakeholders. In the end, all four models were either rejected 
or withdrawn – typically on the grounds that the administrative burdens they would 
generate were too high or that they would create cashflow problems, particularly for 
smaller employers. In the March 2015 Budget, the Government opted for a new approach 
in the form of a ‘digital apprenticeship voucher’ that would put employers in control of 
government funding by using the vouchers to directly purchase training.98 This was soon 
followed by the announcement of an ‘apprenticeship levy’ in the Summer 2015 Budget to 
support all post-16 apprenticeships in England, with the digital vouchers being used to 
control where the levy funds would be spent.99 After yet another consultation, the 2015 
90  Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Research Paper Number 77 - Evaluation of Apprenticeships: 
Employers, 2012, 41–48.
91  Ibid., 62–64. 
92  Ibid., 67. 
93  Kuczera, Striking the Right Balance: Costs and Benefits of Apprenticeship, 23–28.
94  Ibid., 23.
95  Ibid.
96  Richard, The Richard Review of Apprenticeships, 109. 
97  Ibid. 
98  HM Treasury, Budget 2015, 2015, 49.
99  HM Treasury, Summer Budget 2015, 2015, 60. 
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Autumn Statement described how the levy would operate from April 2017:
It will be set at a rate of 0.5% of an employer’s paybill. Each employer will receive an 
allowance of £15,000 to offset against their levy payment. This means that the levy 
will only be paid on any paybill in excess of £3 million and that less than 2% of UK 
employers will pay it. The levy will be paid through Pay As You Earn. By 2019-20, the 
levy will raise £3 billion in the UK.100
Over 60 countries have a levy scheme in operation,101 including the UK in sectors such as 
construction. Even so, there were elements of the Government’s proposed levy that made 
it highly unusual. For example, employer funds would be passed directly to HM Treasury 
with no arms-length body or agency to coordinate how the funding is used. The OECD 
has previously stated that this approach would create “a risk that the proceeds might be 
diverted to different purposes.”102 Professor Alison Wolf had recommended earlier in 2015 
that a levy be introduced to fund apprenticeships but emphasised the need for it to be 
placed into a hypothecated (i.e. ring-fenced) fund to ensure that it remains a secure 
source of long-term funding.103 Should any government fail to protect the funds it collects 
through a levy, the OECD warned that “employers may look at their contribution simply as 
a tax and lack commitment.”104 Other causes for concern included the prospect of 
substantial deadweight as companies try to claim levy funds for as many forms of training 
as possible. In addition, the OECD had previously found that “better qualified employees 
or those at higher occupational levels, and employees in large firms seem to derive 
greater benefit from levy schemes” as the returns on investment are seen to be higher.105
Numerous issues were also raised by business groups after the levy’s announcement.  
The CBI almost immediately called for a “radical rethink”, citing a range of design flaws.106 
A survey of their members in 2016 found that 45 per cent of respondents planned to 
increase prices or reduce margins in response to the levy, 39 per cent would cut 
investment in non-apprenticeship training and 22 per cent felt that there would be 
downward pressure on wages.107 Meanwhile, the EEF manufacturing group stated in their 
response to the levy consultation in 2016 that their members did not expect to deliver 
much more training in response to the levy.108 
In hindsight, the above predictions have been proved largely correct. The OECD was of 
the view that some employers might write off the levy as a tax, there might be significant 
deadweight costs and better qualified employees stood to benefit the most – all of which 
appear to be borne out by the decrease in apprenticeship quantity and quality discussed 
earlier in this report. The fears among employers, namely that the levy was not designed 
properly and would not necessarily encourage organisations to offer apprenticeships, look 
equally robust. With the evidence available both then and now, there was no need for the 
levy system to be constructed and begin operating in such a way that these outcomes 
became more likely (or, in some cases, almost inevitable).
100  HM Treasury, Spending Review and Autumn Statement 2015, 45. 
101  Normann Müller and Friederike Behringer, Subsidies and Levies as Policy Instruments to Encourage Employer-Provided 
Training (OECD, 2012), 26.
102  Ibid., 39. 
103  Alison Wolf, Fixing a Broken Training System: The Case for an Apprenticeship Levy (Social Market Foundation, 2015), 15.
104  Müller and Behringer, Subsidies and Levies as Policy Instruments to Encourage Employer-Provided Training, 38. 
105  Ibid., 41.
106  Confederation of British Industry, ‘“Radical Rethink” Required for Apprenticeship Levy’, Press release, 28 April 2016.
107  Confederation of British Industry, CBI/Pearson Education and Skills Survey 2016 (Confederation of British Industry, 
2016), 7.
108  EEF, ‘EEF Response to the Apprenticeship Levy Funding Guidance’, Press release, 11 October 2016.
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3.4 The administrative burdens created by the levy
For those employers using the new HMRC digital accounts, the task facing them is a 
daunting one. Although large companies with sizeable HR departments will presumably 
find a way to navigate this new regime, that does not excuse its complexity or onerous 
nature. Levy-paying employers must now take responsibility for the following tasks 
through their digital accounts:
 > Constantly monitoring the amount of levy funds they have available in total and for 
each apprentice in their organisation.
 > Monitoring their transactions with training providers for each apprentice on a 
monthly basis.
 > Keeping track of the expiry dates of all the levy funds they currently have available.
 > Adding, reviewing and checking the status of all their current contracts with 
training providers for each apprentice. 
 > Searching for, and updating the status of, each apprentice in their organisation.
These tasks are all on top of the requirement for employers to search for, and then engage 
in price negotiations with, training providers and assessment providers for each 
apprentice as well as organise and sign contracts. Large employers may be able to 
handle these extensive duties, but the plan to bring small and medium-sized employers 
into the same system by April 2019 are concerning in light of these new responsibilities. 
At no point during the reforms to apprenticeships enacted since 2012 have employers 
expressed a strong desire to take on these burdens. Under the pre-levy system, training 
providers were able to shoulder most of these responsibilities, which allowed employers 
to concentrate on training apprentices. It is difficult to see how employers can pass some, 
or indeed any, of these responsibilities onto providers under the levy system given the use 
of HMRC-operated accounts. In these circumstances it is unsurprising that, as described 
at the beginning of this chapter, employer representatives have been forceful and direct in 
their criticisms. 
3.5 Reducing the burdens on employers
The Richard Review was adamant that the only way to justify asking employers for cash 
contributions was if the Government was more generous in other respects by, for 
example, reimbursing part of their internal training costs or a proportion of an apprentice’s 
wages. Offsetting of this nature was necessary “to ensure that overall, employers are not 
worse off”.109 This need to balance employer contributions with some related employer 
benefits has been ignored by ministers and civil servants, removing any justification for 
demanding a cash contribution from employers. 
It is hard to know at this stage which factors have contributed most to the decline in 
apprenticeship starts since the levy came into effect. That said, previous research 
suggests that the demand for cash contributions from employers, who already face 
significant costs when hiring and training apprentices, is likely to have played an important 
role. As always, it is small employers who are the most vulnerable, as neatly described by 
the OECD last year:
109  Richard, The Richard Review of Apprenticeships, 109. 
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The provision of apprenticeships and the use of subsidies involve costs. The cost of 
these procedures may be less significant for bigger enterprises, relative to their 
overall training costs. Small enterprises may lack the capacity to determine training 
needs, plan accordingly and file applications for cost reimbursement or grants. It is 
therefore important to assist small companies with access to and the processing of 
available funding in parallel to providing financial incentives for apprenticeships.110
The OECD believe that smaller employers should be getting more support, not demands 
for more money. The Richard Review, countless research papers, the international 
evidence on employer incentives and the OECD are all stacked against the notion of 
employer cash contributions. This strongly suggests that the 10 per cent co-investment 
rate is likely to lead to widespread disengagement from apprenticeships by small 
employers as well as some larger organisations. 
Recommendation 3: The requirement for 10 per cent employer co-investment towards 
the cost of training apprentices should be removed with immediate effect to avoid 
employers disengaging from apprenticeships.
Even in the absence of employer co-investment, the administrative and logistical burdens 
placed on employers by the HMRC digital accounts need to be reconsidered. The best 
system to support the levy is one that hands the ‘purchasing power’ to employers without 
the need for substantial administrative burdens, particularly for smaller organisations. 
Ironically, the Government has already designed such a system five years ago. In the first 
government consultation on funding apprenticeships released in 2013, one of the options 
presented was a ‘Provider payment’ model.111 While the employer in this model was still 
responsible for selecting a training and assessment provider, the crucial difference between 
this and the new levy system was that the training provider took on the bulk of the 
administrative duties throughout the duration of the training (as was the case before 2012). 
The Government said in March 2014 that it would not pursue the ‘Provider payment’ 
model because “it does not go far enough to deliver the Richard principle of giving 
employers the purchasing power”.112 This made little sense given that employers would 
be fully in control of selecting and paying training providers and assessment providers and 
would also be more involved in managing the apprenticeship than ever before. Small 
businesses were particularly disappointed by the decision to ignore this model, as was 
evident in the small print included at the end of the Government’s consultation response. 
It was acknowledged in the consultation annex that the “common themes in the 
responses received included the importance of minimising administrative burdens on 
employers” and “smaller businesses in particular tended to prefer the provider payment 
model as they felt this was likely to generate the smallest administrative burden.”113 To 
accommodate these concerns, a new ‘apprenticeship voucher’ model should be 
introduced to replace the current system for distributing funds collected through the levy. 
110  Kuczera, Striking the Right Balance: Costs and Benefits of Apprenticeship, 50.
111  Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and Department for Education, A Consultation on Funding Reform for 
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112  HM Government, The Future of Apprenticeships in England: Funding Reform Technical Consultation, 2013, 15.
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Figure 6: Proposed new ‘apprenticeship voucher’ funding model 
Employer logs onto the Digital Apprenticeship Service (DAS)
Employer registers for an ‘apprenticeship voucher’ that covers 
the provision of external training and assessment for an 
apprenticeship of their choice
Employer must use the voucher within 12 months of registration
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
Employer meets with the training provider to confirm that the 
apprentice has completed training towards the apprenticeship 
standard and is ready for the EPA
Training provider then contacts an approved assessment 
provider on behalf of the employer and pays for the delivery of 
the EPA from the funds in their ‘apprenticeship voucher’
Registration
Training
Assessment
Employer searches on the DAS for a registered training provider
Once a training provider has been selected, the employer 
passes the ‘apprenticeship voucher’ to them, at which point 
the training provider registers the apprentice who is about to 
begin training
Training provider reports the receipt of the voucher to the ESFA 
and draws down funding equivalent to the full value of the voucher 
(paid in installments over the duration of the training)
This model would put the purchasing power firmly in the hands of employers by allowing 
them to choose an apprenticeship standard and training provider, but the administration 
of the Individual Learner Record, arranging assessments and other bureaucratic burdens 
would rest with training providers. This system also removes two unhelpful and 
burdensome features of the current levy system:
 > All employers now have access to a single pot of funding produced by 
receipts from the apprenticeship levy with no differentiation between levy-
payers and non-levy payers and no complicated HMRC infrastructure for 
constantly monitoring and moving levy funds
 > The digital accounts for each employer are much simpler as they only need 
to include their voucher purchase history, the names of their chosen training 
provider and a list of their current apprentices
This represents a considerable simplification over the current levy system that will benefit 
all stakeholders, especially those who do not necessarily have the time or resources to 
engage with the apprenticeship system as it now stands. Crucially, all of this can be 
achieved within the existing ‘digital account’ infrastructure designed by HMRC for 
employers.
Recommendation 4: The Government should replace the existing HMRC digital 
payment system with a simpler ‘apprenticeship voucher’ model to give employers control 
of government funding while reducing their administrative burdens.
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One notable impact of introducing this new ‘apprenticeship voucher’ would be that it 
creates a truly demand-led system for apprenticeships with employers in the driving seat. 
This would have implications for HM Treasury in terms of controlling public expenditure. 
Consideration should be given to the ESFA setting a ‘maximum annual allocation’ of 
apprenticeship starts for each training provider (based largely on historical performance 
data in terms of ‘completions’ and OFSTED ratings). This would ensure that better 
providers are promoted while guarding against any provider over-extending their 
operations. It would also be beneficial to award small-scale allocations to new providers 
who wish to enter the market, with the ESFA closely monitoring them during their first 
phase of apprenticeship delivery. 
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Not only is it important to gain the support of employers for reforming apprenticeships, 
the colleges and private training providers who ultimately deliver the external training and 
assessments within an apprenticeship are also key stakeholders. The Government has 
put in place two ‘registers’ of organisations who they deem suitable to deliver this external 
training and the final assessment for apprentices at the end of their course. This chapter 
will discuss a whole host of problems already facing these two registers that threaten to 
reduce the quality of apprenticeships.
4.1 The Register of Training Providers
Employers must choose a training provider from a new register – the Register of 
Apprenticeship Training Providers (RoATP). The aim of the Register was to “open up the 
market and increase competition and thereby to drive up value for money and quality”.114 
The Government also noted that the Register “should have a strong focus on applicants’ 
capability to deliver high-quality apprenticeships, supported by applicants’ fitness and 
ability to receive public funding. Therefore, applicants to the RoATP would need to pass a 
range of tests in the areas of financial health, due diligence, quality, capacity and 
capability”.115 
There is nothing wrong in principle with allowing new entrants into a market. That said, a 
focus on high-quality provision should remain paramount. In March 2017 Amanda 
Spielman, who had recently been appointed as the new Chief Inspector at Ofsted, noted 
that “it is clear there are a lot of would be new entrants, a lot of people with very limited 
experience and potentially quite a lot of fragmentation”,116 which presents a considerable 
challenge to Ofsted as well as the ESFA. Since the application process for the Register 
was opened, several incidents have suggested that quality is not being sufficiently 
reinforced by the ESFA.
The initial task facing the ESFA was to invite applications from training providers who 
wished to join the Register in order to train apprentices in levy-paying employers, after 
which they accepted applications from training providers who wished to bid to deliver a 
share of a £650 million contract to work with non-levy paying employers. The final list of 
over 2,500 organisations that have made it onto the Register117 contains some 
questionable entries. For example, there are over 100 organisations on the Register that 
have either not been trading for a sufficient length of time to provide a set of financial 
accounts to the ESFA or have been previously censured by the ESFA for poor 
performance.118 In addition, 32 per cent of the providers now able to deliver training to 
non-levy payers have been awarded their first ever apprenticeships contract,119 echoing 
Amanda Spielman’s concerns about the limited experience of many providers. 
The first sign that new entrants to the market may potentially weaken the apprenticeships 
programme has come from Ofsted’s early monitoring visit of Key6 Group Limited, which 
was created in 2015 and accepted onto the Register in March 2017. This visit resulted in 
Ofsted declaring that the apprenticeships being provided “are not fit for purpose” and 
deliver “a poor standard of training”.120 Their report stated that the Key6 Group had begun 
“swiftly recruiting apprentices in a relatively short space of time” after being added onto 
the Register and that “the large majority of apprentices are not even aware that they are 
an apprentice, and identify themselves as studying a level five management course”.121 
The apprentices told inspectors that they were “not learning anything new on their 
114  Skills Funding Agency, Supporting Quality and Employer Choice through a New Register of Apprenticeship Training 
Providers, 2016, 3.
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116  Pippa Allen-Kinross, ‘Review of Apprentice Provider List Planned’, FE Week, 29 September 2017.
117  Education and Skills Funding Agency, ‘Apprenticeship Training Providers’, Webpage, 14 March 2008.
118  Jonathan Owen, ‘Exclusive: ESFA Gives Millions to Apprenticeship Providers That Have Failed to Meet Standards’, 
Times Educational Supplement, 21 February 2018.
119  Billy Camden, ‘Revealed: The 714 Providers That Won Non-Levy Tender Funding’, FE Week, 11 December 2017.
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Week, 15 March 2018.
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apprenticeship” and had been asked to “shoehorn existing work in a portfolio to get a free 
qualification”. The response from Key6 was to complain about the Ofsted report while 
citing the fact that they are “a young organisation which inevitably will go through 
continuous improvement.”122 
As this was only the first monitoring visit to a new entrant by Ofsted, it is too early to say 
how many other new providers will raise similar concerns. Meanwhile, the ESFA had 
already decided to introduce additional checks after the application process was 
completed. In March 2017, it announced that new providers would be required to attend 
mandatory training before any apprenticeship activity starts. In addition, an ESFA 
‘snapshot’ of the new provider’s delivery three to six months into their training could 
potentially result in them being taken off the Register.123 In September last year, the ESFA 
also said that it would ‘review’ how the Register operates in light of the results of the 
application process.124 Even so, the volume of new market entrants presents a 
considerable challenge in terms of maintaining high-quality provision across hundreds of 
new apprenticeship standards.
Not only are many seemingly unsuitable organisations now on the Register and able to 
access millions of pounds in government funding, some high-profile providers with a 
strong track record in apprenticeships have been excluded. Exeter College - one of the 
most successful colleges in the country and rated ‘outstanding’ by Ofsted - was denied a 
contract for supporting non-levy paying employers, as was Newcastle and Stafford 
Colleges Group, which is rated ‘good’ by Ofsted and has an apprenticeship achievement 
rate of 84 per cent.125 At the time of writing, the recriminations from the application 
process are far from over as at least 50 complaints have been lodged with the ESFA126 in 
an attempt to overturn these decisions and others like them. 
As noted in the previous chapter, being placed on the Register is merely the first step for 
providers. Their next task is to negotiate a price with employers for the external training 
they provide. In 2012 the Richard Review proposed that the price for apprenticeship 
training should be freed from government control, meaning that employers and providers 
would negotiate the cost of whatever training was delivered.127 The Review predicted that 
“a market-led price for the provision of apprenticeship training will lead to higher quality 
training, lower prices and, ultimately, better outcomes for the learner, employer and 
society.”128 
This vision was not supported by evidence at the time. As the Institute for Fiscal Studies 
have since pointed out, the exact opposite is a much more likely outcome under the levy: 
…there will be little scope for providers to compete on price – the price of training has 
little effect on the cost to the employer. Thus there will be little incentive for providers 
to price below a given band’s maximum. […]we would expect to see a strong 
tendency for providers to price training courses at or close to the level of the relevant 
band maximum. This could be reinforced by the fear of training providers that pricing 
below the maximum would signal that a course is of lower quality. One related side 
effect of this likely bunching of providers at the band maxima is that it will make it 
difficult for employers to use price signals as a guide to quality.129
Once a training provider – however inexperienced or unsuitable – gets onto the Register, 
their rational response is to push prices as high as possible to receive the maximum 
subsidy available for every apprentice from the government’s levy pot. The quality and 
relevance of the training provided is little more than a footnote in this scenario, contrary to 
122  Ibid.
123  Billy Camden, ‘Confusion for New Providers on RoATP over Compulsory Training’, FE Week, 19 May 2017.
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what the Richard Review envisaged. 
The decision not to assign fixed prices to each apprenticeship, which was essentially the 
system used before the apprenticeship levy, appears to have compounded the overall 
complexity of the levy. What’s more, in recent weeks the Government has announced that 
the entire 15-band funding structure is to be reviewed (before the levy even reached a full 
year of operation).130 They are also reconsidering the whole concept of employer-provider 
negotiations, despite insisting on it for the last six years, as many employers have told 
them that “they do not feel able to negotiate with providers”.131 
Recommendation 5: All apprenticeship standards and end-point assessments for 
apprentices should be assigned a fixed cost by the Education and Skills Funding Agency 
to remove the need for complicated price and contract negotiations between employers 
and both training and assessment providers. 
4.2 The Register of Assessment Organisations 
After choosing a training provider, employers must select an organisation from the 
Register of End-Point Assessment Organisations (RoEPAO) to deliver an ‘end-point 
assessment’ (EPA) for each apprentice at the end of their training. The training provider 
then contracts with the EPA provider on behalf of the employer to deliver the assessment. 
As with the register for training providers, the government guidance states that any 
organisation wishing to be included on this register of assessment organisations must 
meet a range of entry criteria that analysed their financial health, organisational capacity 
and capability and also their sector experience and knowledge.132 As of February 2018, 
there were 126 organisations listed on the RoEPAO.133
The Register itself is overseen by the ESFA, which is purely a funding body and has no 
background or expertise in judging the capability and capacity of prospective assessment 
providers. The bottleneck created by putting the ESFA in charge of the Register meant 
that in the summer of 2017 at least 1,300 apprentices had started their training without an 
EPA in place, leaving them unable to complete their apprenticeship. In addition, one-third 
of all apprenticeship standards still had no assessment organisation listed against them 
while another third only had one.134 
Once on the Register, assessment organisations are free to offer EPAs for any of the 
apprenticeship standards that have been approved for delivery. Seeing as there are now 
over 250 approved standards,135 the scale of potential confusion and duplication 
becomes immediately apparent. As of March 2018, there are 19 different assessment 
organisations on the Register offering an EPA for the ‘Team Leader / Supervisor’ standard, 
15 organisations offering an EPA for the ‘Retailer’ standard, 13 organisations offering an 
EPA for the ‘Retail Team Leader’ standard, 13 offering an EPA for ‘Customer Service 
Practitioner’ and 11 offering an EPA for ‘Hospitality Team Member’.136 This issue – which 
could conceivably get even worse if more assessment organisations decide to offer the 
same EPAs – poses significant risks to the quality of the apprenticeship programme. The 
NAO had already stated in 2016 that the Government’s approach to assessing 
apprentices would inject a variety of risks into what is now the levy system: 
 > Employers might look to use assessors whose standards are lower than others 
130  Education and Skills Funding Agency, ‘Apprenticeship Funding Bands’, Webpage, 12 March 2018.
131  Jude Burke, ‘Apprenticeship Funding Bands Set to Change’, FE Week, 21 February 2018.
132  Education and Skills Funding Agency, ‘Register of End-Point Assessment Organisations: How to Apply’, Webpage, 15 
March 2018.
133  Education and Skills Funding Agency, ‘Using the Register of End-Point Assessment Organisations’, Webpage, 29 
January 2018.
134  Alix Robertson, ‘Assessment Organisations Still Lacking for over 1,300 Apprentices’, FE Week, 7 July 2017.
135  Education and Skills Funding Agency, ‘Register of End-Point Assessment Organisations: How to Apply’.
136  Ibid.
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 > Assessors might look to win more work by lowering their assessment standards 
 > Employers might collude with assessors to sign off apprentices without checking
 > Assessors might collude with employers to sign off apprentices without 
checking137 
Just months before the levy came into force, the NAO found that the “DfE has not yet 
established what information it will need to monitor key behavioural risks and spot signals 
that these risks may be maturing.”138 Several loopholes have since been identified and 
exploited. For example, it was reported in February 2017 that three sectors – retail, 
hospitality and leisure – had managed to find a way for employers to assess their own 
apprentices at the end of their training, which undermined the explicit requirement for 
every EPA to be independently judged.139 
The on-going quality assurance of the organisations accepted onto the Register is more 
troubling still. Once a group of employers has designed a new apprenticeship standard, 
they can choose from four different options to monitor the quality of the EPAs delivered by 
assessment organisations on the Register: 
 > The exam regulator Ofqual;
 > An ‘employer-led’ model; 
 > A professional body; 
 > The Institute for Apprenticeships (IfA)
Ofqual – the only one of the four options that can offer sufficient expertise in assessment 
validity and reliability – is responsible for formally regulating just 29 apprenticeship 
standards. The IfA, which only came into existence in April 2017 alongside the levy, was 
supposed to focus on supporting employers as they develop new apprenticeship 
standards and ‘assessment plans’ (which give a high-level overview of what an EPA 
should include). Nevertheless, the fledging IfA has been selected for the quality assurance 
of 98 apprenticeship standards despite being set up just a matter of months ago and 
having no track record or proficiency in regulating national assessments.140 This situation 
has been allowed to develop despite the IfA stating on numerous occasions that it should 
only be used ‘as a last resort’.141 
In total, there are now around 40 different bodies who are listed in assessment plans and 
want to offer quality assurance across the four options listed above. The IfA website 
claims that all four options must “[monitor] the performance of different [assessment 
organisations], the effectiveness of the apprenticeship standard and assessment plan; 
checking it is reliable, rigorous and fit-for-purpose”.142 This makes no mention of how the 
validity and reliability of the real assessment tools being used to assess apprentices will 
be checked both now and in future. In such a system, there is no dependable way to 
prevent poor practice and inappropriate behaviour on the part of employers or 
assessment organisations when the responsibility for monitoring them – and the expertise 
required to do effectively – is spread so thinly. 
Irrespective of how well the apprenticeship levy has been designed, if the supporting 
structures like this Register fail to deliver the necessary safeguards to protect against a 
‘race to the bottom’ in service quality then taxpayers and apprentices are the ones most 
likely to lose out. Genuine high-quality EPAs are vital to the integrity and credibility of 
apprenticeships. So long as employers can pick and choose who monitors them and their 
assessment providers in delivering EPAs, it is hard to see how the apprenticeship system 
137  National Audit Office, Delivering Value through the Apprenticeships Programme, 40.
138  Ibid., 10.
139  Jude Burke, ‘Employers in Three Sectors to Grade Their Own Apprentices’, FE Week, 17 February 2017.
140  Education and Skills Funding Agency, ‘Register of End-Point Assessment Organisations: How to Apply’.
141  Institute for Apprenticeships, Driving the Quality of Apprenticeships in England, 2017, 14.
142  Institute for Apprenticeships, ‘External Quality Assurance’, Webpage, 2018.
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will be respected. The contrast between this incomplete approach to quality assurance 
for apprenticeships and the rigorous manner in which GCSEs and A-levels standards are 
protected nowadays could hardly be greater. The NAO was right to warn of the dangers 
inherent in pursuing the current model. To counteract these problems, new measures 
need to be introduced to provide much greater assurance for apprentices and taxpayers: 
 > Responsibility for administering the Register of End-Point Assessment 
Organisations should be moved from the ESFA to Ofqual
 > All the existing options for quality-assuring EPAs should be scrapped save for the 
option of an assessment provider registering with Ofqual
 > Ofqual should be formally given responsibility for judging the quality of the 
assessment plans put forward by groups of employers when developing the 
apprenticeship standards
 > Ofqual should require a complete set of sample assessment tools (e.g. written 
examinations, practical assessment sheets) before any new apprenticeship 
standard is cleared for delivery
 > Only one set of assessment tools should be allowed per apprenticeship standard, 
meaning that any assessment provider will use the same set of standardised tools 
for each EPA
Any additional resource required to deliver these measures should be drawn from the 
funds generated by the apprenticeship levy as they are required to ensure that these 
funds are spent appropriately.
Recommendation 6: The exam regulator Ofqual should be made the only option for 
quality assuring the end-point assessments for apprentices to ensure that standards are 
maintained over time and poor practice is quickly identified and eradicated. 
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Conclusion
The opening page of the Richard Review in 2012 observed that the growth in 
apprenticeship numbers in the years leading up to this pivotal document had “led us to 
stretch the definition of what an apprenticeship is too far and, as a consequence, we risk 
losing sight of the core features of what makes apprenticeships work, what makes them 
unique.”143 There is a real danger that, six years on, the same mistakes could be made all 
over again. It would be foolhardy to suggest that apprenticeships should never move 
beyond traditional sectors such as manufacturing and engineering in this country’s 
services-led economy. It would, however, be equally foolhardy to allow the movement 
beyond traditional sectors to endanger the value and prestige offered by the very best 
apprenticeships in genuinely skilled occupations.
The detrimental effect of the levy on the quantity and quality of apprenticeships is 
concerning. The effect of the levy was also mostly, if not entirely, avoidable. By the time 
the levy was announced in 2015, the plans to change the way that apprenticeships would 
be funded had drifted a long way from the principles that the Coalition Government set 
out several years earlier. The Richard Review stated that any funding system must 
incentivise high-quality apprenticeships, be simple and accessible for employers 
(particularly small businesses), actively encourage employers to expand apprenticeship 
opportunities and not result in greater overall investment from employers. The latest data 
on apprenticeships suggest that the levy system is not meeting any of these four 
objectives at present. A new approach is therefore needed.
There is no reason to withdraw support from the apprenticeship levy at this stage. Rather, 
the questions at stake here are: how the levy funds are accessed; what they are spent on; 
and what outcomes the levy generates. This report has concluded that, at present, the 
levy is too complicated for employers, focused on too many inappropriate forms of 
training and as a result is unlikely to deliver value-for-money. Consequently, the 
apprenticeship levy and its supporting systems require significant changes if they are to 
gain and subsequently retain the trust and respect of stakeholders. 
The Government’s recent Social Mobility Strategy set out a clear vision for what it wanted 
from apprenticeships. It recognised that high-quality apprenticeships can transform the 
lives of young people and help them transition from education to work, while the 
apprenticeship levy could incentivise more employers to offer apprenticeships and give 
SMEs a crucial role in improving technical education and tackling skills gaps. These goals 
remain achievable but only if the Government acts quickly to address the problems 
outlined in this report, such as the poor quality of training being offered and the lack of 
emphasis on young people. The potential transformation of the UK labour market 
following ‘Brexit’ makes achieving these goals even more critical. If the necessary 
changes are made to the apprenticeship levy then apprentices, taxpayers and employers 
across the country stand to benefit for many years to come. 
143  Richard, The Richard Review of Apprenticeships, 2.
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Appendix
Full list of apprenticeship standards with recorded starts by 
October 2017 that cover low-skill training courses, duplicated 
roles and professional development courses
Advanced Butcher
Aviation Ground Operative
Business Administrator
Chartered Manager Degree Apprenticeship
Customer Service Practitioner
Dental Practice Manager
Food and Drink Advanced Process Operator
Gas Network Team Leader
Healthcare Assistant Practitioner
Healthcare Science Assistant
Hospitality Supervisor
Hospitality Team Member
Housing/Property Management Assistant
HR Consultant / Partner
Insurance Professional
Investment Operations Administrator
Investment Operations Specialist
Lead Adult Care Worker
Operations/Departmental Manager
Rail Engineering Operative
Retail Manager
Retail Team Leader
Retailer
Senior Financial Services Customer Adviser
Senior Healthcare Support Worker
Senior Housing/Property Management
Team Leader/Supervisor
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